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Abstract

The tendency to claim more knowledge than one actually has is common and well
documented, however little research has focused on the neural mechanisms that underlie
this phenomenon. The goal of the present study was to investigate the cortical correlates
of overclaiming. Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) was delivered to the Medial
Prefrontal Cortex (MPFC), Supplementary Motor Area (SMA), and Precuneus during the
presentation of a series of words that participants were told made up a Cultural I.Q. test.
However, participants were not informed that 50% of the words were actually fabricated.
False claiming was reduced following MPFC TMS. Furthermore, reaction time
decreases following MPFC TMS indicated that participants engaged in less reflection
during the task, suggesting a potential reduction in social monitoring of behavior.
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Overclaiming and the Medial Prefrontal Cortex: A Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation Study
Misperceptions about the self and others pervade social life, and the degree to
which individuals can correctly perceive and report on their abilities has been debated
(Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003; Paulhus, 1998; Kwan, Barrios, Ganis, Gorman,
Lange, Kumar, Shepard, & Keenan, 2007; John & Robins, 1994). In the domain of trait
attributions, one may find a large discrepancy between the perception and presentation of
self-related information and the actual reality of those characteristics (Alicke, 1985;
Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, Robins, 2004; Neisser, 1988). Motivation to portray oneself
in a more positive light is quite common in social interactions. Snyder (1974) describes
monitoring of the self as the process through which people regulate their own behavior in
order to be perceived in a favorable way. With the use of social comparison information,
it is possible to not only direct the appropriateness of one’s actions from situation to
situation, but also to present the most favorable image of the self to others (Snyder &
Cantor, 1980; Snyder & Simpson, 1984; Snyder & Gangestad, 1982; Amodio & Frith,
2006). This egoistic bias represents a deceptive tendency to enhance one’s social, moral,
physical, and intellectual status (Paulhus & John, 1998). Specifically, this self
enhancement bias can result in an individual reporting higher intelligence or claiming to
have more knowledge than one actually possesses (Paulhus & Harms, 2004; Paulhus,
Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003).
In studies of desirable responding, Paulhus (1991) has defined overclaiming as
the tendency to claim more knowledge than is possible. With the overclaiming
phenomenon, it has been demonstrated that false knowledge can be claimed on tests
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requiring individuals to admit familiarity with non-existent or impossible topics or events
(Paulhus et al., 2003). Such common inclinations to overclaim may serve to maintain
self-esteem, promote social desirability, and aid in impression management (MesmerMagnus, Viswesvaran, Deshpande, & Joseph, 2006). Biases of this nature may be
adaptive and reveal a connection to mental health, particularly positive self-regard
(Bonnano, Field, Kovacevic, & Kaltman, 2002; Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kusmashiro,
& Rusbult, 2004).
One of the most valuable sources of self-information consists o f feedback given
by others on one’s personal characteristics and behaviors. People often pay close
attention to how other people view and assess their own personal characteristics. These
appraisals from the environment allow a person to learn about the self (Morin, 2004).
They can also be used to develop internal standards for self-evaluation. In addition, they
can trigger self-observation, especially when the information does not fit one’s current
self-concept (Morin, 2004). Research suggests that people not only construct their selfimage using direct feedback from others, but they are also influenced by how they think
others view them (Morin, 2004). This reflected self-awareness often involves a social
comparison process of the self to another person. By comparing oneself to an inferior
other, an individual can feel superior, successful, and satisfied (Lockwood & Matthews,
2007). However, finding out that another person is more competent or more intelligent
than oneself can often be discouraging and may lead to low self-esteem and depression
(Lockwood & Matthews, 2007). In order to reduce the damage done by such
comparisons, people usually adopt biased processing of self-related information. That is,
people have a tendency to readily accept positive information about the self whereas
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negative or threatening information goes through a more critical evaluation process and is
often disregarded (Epley & Whitchurch, 2008). This positive illusion arises in order to
compensate for the gap between the way an individual perceives oneself and others
(Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond & Robins, 2004). Thus, although social feedbacks is valid, it
is not always an accurate source of self-information, and even in the face of truth, people
can misinterpret the information and form overly positive self-concepts during the
process of introspection (Morin, 2004).
Researchers have yet to fully explain the process of overclaiming. Overclaiming
may result, in part, because of a memory bias in which humans tend to find familiarity in
almost everything (Williams, Paulhus, & Nathanson, 2002). Other empirical evidence
confirms such a trend and suggests an adaptive prevalence o f false memories related to
the self (Okado & Stark, 2003). False memories represent imagined depictions of reality
that are accepted as truth (Gonsalves, Reber, Gitelman, Parrish, Marsel-Mesulam, &
Paller, 2004). The extent to which overclaiming is an automatic or conscious process has
not been fully investigated (Paulhus & Harms, 2004). Despite the ambiguities, it is
generally agreed upon, that at some level, respondents are not willing to admit ignorance
on a topic that seems like it should be known (Paulhus, 1991). Specifically, Bradley
(1981) highlights that this overconfidence is especially likely to occur in areas of
perceived expertise. Overall, most of the research on overclaiming has focused on the
degree to which it represents an ego-protecting response. A focal point in the literature
has been on individual differences, such as narcissism, that are linked to overclaiming
(Paulhus & Williams 2002). There has been comparably less work presenting it in the
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framework of deceptive self-monitoring and little research examining the neural
correlates of overclaiming.
While Paulhus and Reid (1991) described the overclaimer as being prone to selfdeceptive positivity, few have labeled the phenomenon as overt deception. Deception in
this sense refers to a deliberate misrepresentation of information about the self or others
(Trivers, 1991; Stevens, Guise, Christiana, Kumar & Keenan, 2007; Spence et al., 2001;
Vrij, 2001). Such misrepresentations have been classified as Machiavellian social
manipulations, and have been linked to both narcissism and a tendency to self-enhance on
objective tests (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Byrne (1998) describes this intelligence as a
mechanism that has evolved out of the complexity o f living in close social groups. As an
adaptive ability, deceptive behavior characterizes many of our social interactions
(DePaulo, 1998). Such deception allows us to have exaggerated perceptions of control in
conditions of extreme adversity (Taylor & Armor, 1994; Bonnano et al., 2002), and
enables us to deal with a social environment that is simultaneously competitive and
cooperative (Byrne, 1998).
Deception is intimately linked to the ability to attribute mental states to others. If
one can understand one’s own thoughts through introspection, one can also infer other
people’s thoughts based on one’s own mental state. This process is called perspective
taking or theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). It has been discovered that there
is a positive relationship between theory of mind and deception ability (Johnson et al.,
2005). Because intentional deception requires the understanding of the mental state of
another, it is necessary for one to possess a theory of mind in order to successfully
deceive others (Johnson et al., 2005). For instance, people with schizotypal personality

Overclaiming 8

traits who lack self-awareness also demonstrate deception deficits (Bamacz, Johnson,
Constantino, & Keenan, 2004). Furthermore, cognitive and emotional deficits may lead
to decreases in deception use or ability (Johnson et al., 2005).
Sedikides (1993) categorized the self-evaluation process into three primary
routes: self-assessment, self-verification, and self-enhancement. Self-assessment refers
to gathering of objective self-relevant information (i.e. taking exams such as an IQ test or
GRE); self-verification is a process of trying to reconfirm one’s preexisting self-concept
by seeking feedback that already exists in one’s self-image; self-enhancement involves
positive biasing o f self-relevant information (Sedikides, 1993). Thus, self-evaluation
requires analyzing the self by combining the internal self-image and public self
representation. Many studies have demonstrated that among three major self-evaluation
processes, the motivation to self-enhance plays the most powerful role in determining and
forming the self-concept (Epley & Whitchurch, 2008; Guenther & Alicke, 2007;
Sedikides, 1993).
Little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying self-enhancement bias
since there is no direct and accurate way to measure the neurological correlation between
the brain and self-evaluation. However, through neuroimaging and patient population
studies, it is possible to predict that certain brain regions are involved in the process.
Indeed, many studies have indicated a possible role for self-evaluation in the Medial
Prefrontal Cortex (MPFC) (Kwan et al., 2007). Neuroimaging studies have presented a
number of findings of particular relevance to self-monitoring, self-enhancement, and selfrelated deception. While different types of deception reveal varied patterns of activation,
it appears that the Medial Prefrontal Cortex (MPFC) plays an important role in
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processing self-related information necessary to misrepresent characteristics of the self.
Specifically, the MPFC shows strong activation in self-referential processing (Oschner et
al., 2005; Johnson et ah, 2005; Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2009). For example, reflecting on
one’s own thoughts, personality traits, or personal reputations involves MPFC regions
(Izuma et ah, 2009). Oschner et ah (2004) suggested that sub regions of the MPFC are
selectively activated for self-judgments, and Macrae et ah (2004) concluded that activity
in the MPFC significantly predicted memory performance for self-relevant judgments. In
addition, it should be specified that such activation in the cortical midline regions is
potentially stronger in reference to the present self, as differentiated from appraisals of
the self in the past (D ’argenbeau et ah, 2008).
When comparing the self to close others on desirable and undesirable traits, a
recent study found that TMS delivered to the MPFC disrupted self-enhancement, as
compared to stimulation to the Precuneus (Pz) and a sham condition. (Kwan, Barrios,
Ganis, Gorman, Lange, Kumar, Shepard, & Keenan, 2007). In this study, participants
were presented with egoistic and moralistic words to determine if the positive or negative
adjectives described themselves. It was found that TMS disrupted yes responses to
egoistic words, suggesting a selective role of the MPFC for self-enhancement (Kwan et
ah, 2007). For self-evaluations and social desirability, Craik et ah (1999) also found
involvement of the MPFC regions in judgments of trait adjectives during Positron
Emission Tomography (PET). During self and other judgment trials, significantly greater
activation of MPFC was observed during “s e lf’ trials than “other” trials using fMRI
(Heatherton et ah, 2007). Moreover, depressed individuals, who exhibit less or no self
enhancement motivation than non-depressed individuals, showed decreased blood flow to
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the MPFC in PET studies (Barrios et al., 2008). Taylor & Brown (1988) suggested that
mentally healthy individuals have a tendency to have unrealistically positive views of the
self, exaggerated perceptions of personal control, and unrealistic optimism. Thus, nondepressed and mentally healthy individuals are likely to indicate more desirable ratings
for themselves as compared to their best friend during the baseline condition (Sham
TMS). Thus, TMS delivery to MPFC may decrease participants’ tendency to selfenhance compared to a Sham TMS condition (Barrios et al., 2008; Kwan et al., 2007).
Based on these studies, it is possible to predict that MPFC plays a critical role in selfevaluation, and is particularly important for comparing the self to others.
With regards to deception, Langleben et al. (2005), in an fMRI study, found
increased superior medial and inferolateral prefrontal cortical activation during deception.
Spence et al. (2001) and Lee et al. (2002) found MPFC, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
as well as bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal cortical activity during deceptive responses.
Additionally, a study by Ganis and colleagues (2003) revealed similar links between
deception and changes of MPFC, ACC, motor cortex, and occipital activation. It was
concluded by Spence et al. (2005) that MPFC and ACC are indeed involved in deception.
Lou et al. (2004) suggested that the medial parietal region could be thought of as a nodal
structure in self-representation functionally connected to both the right and the medial
prefrontal cortices. Their TMS findings indicated that this network has similarities to
networks of the resting conscious state, which may demonstrate that self-monitoring is a
main function of resting consciousness (Lou et al. 2004). Similarly, Gusnard et al. (2001)
suggested that self-reflective thought, as mediated by the MPFC, may represent a default
mode of mental activity, and Johnson et al. (2006) was in accord with this position
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distinguishing the dorsal MPFC as an area associated with an inward-directed self
focused agenda. Specifically, these authors found the dorsal MPFC region associated
with self-related intentions (Johnson et al., 2006). Furthermore, a review by Schmitz and
Johnson (2007) implicates the dorsal-ventral axis o f the MPFC as an ideal substrate for
the evaluation and manipulation of self-relevant information necessary for the process of
self-monitoring in a social environment. Nevertheless, these studies were not designed to
test self-enhancement bias in the form of overclaiming. Thus, the neural correlates of
overclaiming remain largely unknown.
If overclaiming is a form of deceptive self-monitoring that relies highly on self
relevant processing, it is plausible that it may be mediated, in part, by contributions of the
MPFC. To test this possibility, the current study utilized Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation (TMS) in a “virtual lesion” design. In this manner, TMS allows one to
temporarily disrupt processing of brain regions during cognitive tasks. An advantage of
this method is that a causal role can be determined in light o f the recent neuroimaging
findings on deception.
In this study, we delivered TMS to the MPFC under conditions that would reveal
overclaiming behavior on a basic response task. To measure overclaiming, a technique
similar to that used by Paulhus and Bruce (1990) was implemented in which respondents
had to rate their familiarity with a set of items presented as a Cultural I.Q. test. The list
contained a corpus of items that an educated individual would likely know, including
notable historical individuals, novels, events, vocabulary, and characters (Paulhus &
Bruce, 1990). Unbeknownst to the participants, 50% of the items on the I.Q. test were
foil words, fabricated to sound like real items. A yes response would indicate familiarity
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with the term, and a no response would indicate having never heard of the term. Based
on previous research, we expected that participants would behaviorally respond in ways
that indicated overclaiming, that is, participants would say that they knew a number of
the foil words, even though there is no possibility that they definitively had knowledge of
that term. Importantly, we predicted that TMS to the MPFC would affect overclaiming,
such that disruption of the region would reduce the overclaiming bias.
To control for the possibility that TMS merely disrupted one’s ability to process
self-relevant information, and not specifically overclaiming, TMS was also applied to the
Precuneus (Pz). This region has been shown to be more engaged when processing selfrelated information across a number of self-evaluation experiments (Segar, Stone, &
Keenan, 2004; Lou et al. 2004). To our knowledge no studies have implicated Pz in
deception. Hence, stimulation to Pz would possibly slow down reaction times, but not
influence overclaiming significantly. TMS was also delivered to the supplementary
motor area (SMA) as a control stimulation site because it has not been implicated in
self/other differentiation or deception. Sham TMS, or application o f the magnetic coil to
the scalp without stimulation served as our absolute control condition.

M ethod

Participants
Eleven university students were recruited (8 males and 3 females; age M=27.1
SD=10) via flyer and word of mouth for the study. All participants were paid 25 dollars
for their participation and were treated in accordance by guidelines set forth by the
Internal Review Board at Montclair State University and guidelines o f the American
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Psychological Association. All TMS was delivered within the parameters provided by
Wasserman (1998).
Materials
A Magstim, single-pulse TMS device was used for all stimulation. A 70-mm
figure-of-eight coil was used throughout the experiment. All stimuli were presented on a
Dell desktop computer with a 17” CRT monitor. All triggering occurred through
BioPack amplifiers, which were also used for motor threshold determination.
Stimuli
All items were drawn from the comprehensive list adopted by Paulhus et al.
(2003) containing words adopted from Hirsch (1988). The items contained words
referring to historical names, events, books, fine arts, poems, literature, authors, social
science, physical science, law, and popular culture (Paulhus et al. 2003). The foil words
were created to appear as if they legitimately belonged to one of these categories of
cultural literacy. Foils did not resemble any of the other target words in the study, nor
did they closely resemble other already existing terms. As in Paulhus et al. (2003) they
were created to appear to be plausible members of the same categories (Paulhus et al.
2003). Participants were informed that they were taking a Cultural I.Q. test, and were
instructed to respond (yes or no) on the keyboard, depending upon whether they knew the
word that appeared on the screen. They were not informed that 50% of the terms being
presented consisted of foil words.
TMS Procedure
W asserman’s (1998) guidelines were used to set the limits o f stimulation
throughout the testing sessions. The testing was executed in two phases: motor threshold
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determination and the experiment proper. Participants were initially fitted with a tight
Lycra swim cap. Suprathreshold TMS pulses were delivered to locate the region that
provided the greatest MEP response to the contralateral Abductor Pollicis Brevis (APB)
muscle. The coil was relocated across the scalp until the most responsive region was
found that induced MEPs of maximal peak-to-peak amplitude. Determination of
individual MT was employed using procedures outlined by IFCN (Rossini et al., 1994),
such that threshold was established when 50% (5 of 10) o f the TMS pulses delivered
induced a measured MEP of >50 pV. All active stimulation was delivered at 90% MT
during the experiment. All MT measurements were made via BioPack MP150 amplifiers
and software. Once the MT intensity was determined, the cap was marked in the 10/20
International System for EEG electrode positions.
The regions of interest were the Precuneus (Pz), the MPFC, and the SMA.
Cortical placement was identical to those used in similar studies (Barrios, Kwan, Ganis,
Gorman, Romanowski, & Keenan, 2008; Kwan et al., 2007). First, one third of the
distance, nasion to inion, was measured for each participant. MPFC was 1.5 cm anterior
to this location, and SMA was identified as being 3 cm posterior to this location. The
coil was oriented parallel to the mid-sagittal line for all stimulation with the handle
pointed in a posterior orientation (except for APB MT determination in which the coil
was held at -45° from the hemispheric line). The depth of cortical stimulation was never
greater than 2cm, ensuring that the initial effects of TMS were concentrated to the areas
of interest (Wasserman, 1998).
Baseline performance was measured by a Sham condition. During sham, the
TMS coil was held at 90° orientation and held over Cz (standard 10/20 system
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coordinates). Because the regions (MPFC and SMA) are somewhat adjacent, single
pulse TMS was employed to avoid cortical spread. The coil was held manually (e.g., Lou
et al. 2004) to ensure quick shifting of blocks as they changed approximately once per
minute. For all testing sessions, participants wore protective earplugs to prevent transient
threshold shifts caused by the acoustic artifact generated by the discharge of the TMS coil
(Wassermann, 1998).
Measures o f Overclaiming
The list of words was divided into 4 blocks containing 36 words per block. For
each block 50% of the words were real terms (e.g., Ayn Rand, Ampersand), and 50%
were fake terms (e.g., Murphy’s Last Ride, Trey Surf Wear). Therefore, TMS to each of
the four brain regions was delivered during 36 word presentations. All words were
randomized, and all lists were counterbalanced across participants. The order of all brain
region sites was randomized. All words within a block were also randomly presented.
Participants indicated their response (yes or no) via a standard keyboard. For all
trials, TMS was delivered 500ms after the word appeared on the screen (See Figure 1).
Response times (RT) were measured as the amount o f time after the TMS pulse.

Results

We first analyzed reaction time. Overall reaction time was 574.67 (SE = 72.80).
Response times for all conditions are reported in Table 1. To determine if TMS
influenced reaction time, we performed a 2 (veracity) x 4 (brain site) repeated measures
ANOVA. The DV was reaction time (RT). There was no overall interaction between the
IVs (F(3, 30) = 1.34p = .28). We then examined the main effects. It was found that
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there was a significant difference in reaction time for word veracity (F (l, 10) = 22.37, p <
.001). Real words (M = 535.98, SE = 70.59) were identified significantly quicker than
fake words (M = 613.37, SE = 75.84). Additionally, there was a trend for the main effect
of brain area (F(3, 30) = 2.35, p = . 09).
Because the main effect of brain region existed as a trend only, we employed a
series of comparisons to sham. Only MPFC differed significantly from sham (t( 10) = 2.68,p = .023). This result indicated reaction time during MPFC stimulation (M =
499.17, SE = 70.65) was significantly less than reaction time during sham stimulation (M
= 617.93, SE = 89.85). Multiple comparisons were controlled for by employing a
modified stepwise Bonferroni test.
We were unable to include all of the responses in the overall ANOVA due to a
significant number of blank cells for one participant (for example Participant 3 never
answered ‘yes’ to a fake word during sham stimulation). Because o f these blank cells,
we considered response independently. First, there was no significant difference between
yes (yes response indicated that the person thought they knew the word) and no responses
(t( 10) = 1.58, p = . 15). There was a significant interaction between word veracity and
response (F (l, 10) = 5.43,/? = .04). Post-hoc tests revealed the only difference occurred
between yes responses for real and fake words (t(10 = 3.26, p = .009). The nature of the
effect indicated that yes responses for real words (M = 478.94, SE = 51.18) were
significantly quicker than yes responses for fake words (M = 617.04, SE = 68.12).
We then analyzed responses of identification (yes responses). The overall
identification of words was .46 (SE = .055). To simplify presentation, all data are given
in terms of proportion of positive responses. We first performed a 4 x 2 ANOVA for
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brain region by veracity to identify where differences in identifications came from.
Specifically, we were interested in the main effects. For veracity, it was found that there
was a significant main effect such that real words were identified at a significantly higher
rate than fake words (F (1, 10) = 17.14,/? = .002). The real word identification rate was
.58 (SE = .059). The fake word identification rate was .34 (SE = .065). There was no
main effect for brain region, indicating overall response rate did not change due to TMS
(F(3, 30) = .06, p = .98). The main hypothesis in terms o f responses was that the
overclaiming bias would decrease across brain regions compared to sham. During sham
TMS, the rate of claiming to know fake words was .34 (SE = .072). To further analyze
the interaction we examined fake words by employing a Chi Squared Test in which we
subtracted each participant’s number of fake yes responses from their real yes responses.
For example if a participant claimed knowledge of 11 real words and 4 fake words,
his/her index would be 7. This number represents the difference between real and fake
claims of knowledge. For the sham condition, the average difference was 2.82. All four
conditions were compared in terms of this response value. It was found that there was a
significant overall difference between the conditions (X2 (3) = 14.32,/? = .002) (See
figure 2).
To test the nature of this difference, each active brain group was compared to
sham. It was found for MPFC the mean difference was 5.45, which was a significant
difference when compared to sham (M = 2.82) (X2 (1) = 9.24,/? = .002). This difference
indicated fewer knowledge claims for fake words with MPFC TMS than for sham.
Neither Pz (M = 4.0) nor SMA (M = 2.73) differed significantly from sham. These data
indicate that overclaiming responses were reduced only by MPFC stimulation.
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Inspection of individual data revealed that none of the subjects undergoing MPFC
TMS endorsed fake words more often than real words, whereas 18.2 % (n = 2) claimed to
know fake words more often than real words in the sham condition. This proportion,
18.2 percent, was the same for Pz. Surprisingly, 36.4% (n = 4) of participants
undergoing TMS to SMA claimed to know fake words more often than real words.

Discussion

The data suggest that overclaiming is significantly reduced when TMS is
delivered to the MPFC. The difference between claiming to know real and fake words
varied depending on TMS delivery site, such that false claiming (e.g., overclaiming) may
be mediated via the MPFC. Furthermore, decreases in the reaction time found following
MPFC TMS indicated that participants engaged in less reflection during this task,
suggesting a potential reduction in social monitoring o f one’s behavior.
Previous research has described the overclaiming phenomenon as a deceptive bias
involving self-related information, namely one’s knowledge about particular topics or
events (Paulhus et al., 1991; Paulhus & Harms; 2004). Neuroimaging findings have
demonstrated that the MPFC plays an important role in self-referential processing and
reflecting on self-relevant information (Oschner et ah, 2005; Johnson et ah, 2005).
Regions of the MPFC have also been demonstrated to be important for the appraisal of
positive traits for the self in studies employing TMS (Barrios et ah, 2008; Kwan et ah,
2007) and PET (Craik et ah, 1999). Furthermore, the ability to deceive about self
information shows strong activation in the MPFC in studies utilizing fMRI (e.g., Ganis et
ah, 2003; Langleben et ah, 2005; Spence et ah, 2006). This investigation provides further
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support for the role of the MPFC region in deceptively presenting misinformation about
the self, specifically, how much one knows about popular culture.
The misperception and misrepresentation of vital personal attributes such as
social, moral, physical, and intellectual traits is well documented in research on social
monitoring and self-enhancement (Brown, 1986; John & Robins, 1994; Snyder, 1974;
Snyder et al., 1980). The inclination to give desirable responses is guided by the
motivation to present the best impression of oneself from one social situation to another
(Mesmer-Magnus et al., 2006; Snyder, 1974). With regards to social appropriateness and
social comparisons, the tendency to monitor one’s actions is quite common. In situations
that induce either public or private self-awareness, differential response patterns have
been observed between high and low self-monitors (Web, Marsh, Shneiderman, & David,
1989). This implied connection between self-awareness and social monitoring is
supported by neuroimaging findings presented by Lou and colleagues (2004) describing a
network of structures involved in self-representation that are functionally connected to
the right and medial prefrontal cortices. Our study contributes additional findings that
networks involving the MPFC are important for the processes underlying positive self
presentation and social monitoring. Specifically, our findings further demonstrate that
the MPFC may be important for monitoring of the self in a socially demanding situation.
A number of studies on desirable responding and overclaiming have focused on
personality factors (Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Taylor & Lemer, 2003; Paulhus & John,
1998; Taylor et al., 2003). For example, narcissism was found by Paulhus (2002) and
Kwan et al. (2008) to be linked to overclaiming and self-enhancement respectively.
Individual differences have also been observed in the domain of social monitoring. In
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validation studies of social monitoring scales, Snyder (1973) found that theater actors
scored highest on scales of self-monitoring, while hospitalized psychiatric patients scored
lower than university students. It would be interesting for future studies to investigate
activity in the same brain regions with respect to such individual differences and
personality variables. Furthermore, it would be beneficial to examine the extent to which
those individuals who demonstrate overclaiming also score high on measures of self
enhancement.
The virtual lesion design employed by this investigation has enabled us to
establish a link between the brain area of the MPFC and the behavior in question. More
research is needed to determine a definitive causal relationship between the MPFC and
deceptive self-monitoring as witnessed by the overclaiming technique. It remains to be
specified whether this relationship is directly representing a specific connection to false
knowledge claims or more generally to impression management, social monitoring, or
self-related deception. While it may be premature to propose a definitive theoretical link
between deception and overclaiming, it is important to understand whether overclaiming
is as deliberate and purposeful as overt deception, or whether it exists merely as a failure
of signal detection. It may very well be the case that overclaiming on psychometric tests
qualifies as a more automatic phenomenon, whereas overclaiming in the context of a
social interaction is more willful and conscious. This key difference needs to be
examined in future work. Moreover, comparisons between true identification and false
knowledge claims cannot be drawn with this paradigm. True identification was not of
interest in this study, but it would certainly be beneficial for future investigators to
pinpoint whether participants actually knew the real words that they claimed to know,
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possibly by testing knowledge after TMS procedures. Furthermore, conclusions drawn
from this experiment are limited by a somewhat small sample size, and an unequal
number of male and female participants.
Previous studies have pointed out that the MPFC may mediate “feelings-of
knowing” and stimuli familiarity (Schnyer, et al., 2005; Macpherson et al., 2008). It may
be possible that TMS to the MPFC might disrupt the signals associated with the tendency
for fake items to seem familiar. Future studies should seek to investigate the extent to
which an overclaiming bias might actually represent a false memory bias in which
humans find familiarity in almost everything (Williams, 2002; Okado & Stark, 2003).
Additionally, it is possible that a lesion to the MPFC might lead to a decreased ability to
accurately assess one’s memory for a given topic or event (Schyer, et al., 2005).
Consideration for possible widespread changes in areas functionally connected to
the MPFC due to TMS also warrants discussion. For example, Hayward & colleagues
(2007) reported that stimulation to the MPFC led to additional changes in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC), as well as other temporal and parietal regions. The MPFC has
been described as being part of greater neural networks involved in social cognition,
therefore it is important to realize that a “virtual lesion”, although initially restricted to
the MPFC, could lead to changes in other areas. While TMS to cortical regions only has
effects at depths no greater than 2cm, it certainly influences other regions later on in the
temporal sequence (Rossini, et al., 1994).
When studying deceptive social behavior it is always a challenge to do so in
naturalistic ways (Sip, Roepstorff, McGreggor, & Frith 2007). Eliciting realistic
behaviors in the laboratory can be difficult without sufficient motivation from
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participants. It is important when studying deception to take into account the intentions
of the participants as well as the context (Sip et ah, 2007). Therefore, it is to the
advantage of researchers to study deceptive behaviors that are already intrinsically
motivated within the typical human repertoire, such as the natural proclivity to selfenhance. Despite capitalizing on this inherent human tendency, our methods still do not
completely replicate a naturalistic social circumstance. It cannot be assumed that
metacognitive performance on a laboratory “I.Q. Test” reflects behavior that would occur
in real life. Therefore, we advise researchers to take this limitation into consideration as
more ecologically valid ways to measure overclaiming are developed. The goal of our
study was to investigate the cortical correlates of the deceptive tendency to give desirable
responses, as witnessed by the overclaiming technique. Overall, participants claimed to
know less fake words with MPFC TMS than sham. The results extend the findings
implicating this region in deceptive responding and lends significant support to previous
studies that link the MPFC to self-referential processing and self-related deception
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Figure 1
Experimental Design
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Figure 2
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Table 1
Reaction time for fake and real words during each stimulation condition in milliseconds.

Brain Region

Fake Words
mean (ms)

SE

Real Words
mean (ms)

SE

Sham

685.50

106.27

550.42

76.03

SMA

558.56

70.12

499.53

60.24

Pz

687.86

114.63

617.12

94.98

MPFC

521.57

64.61

476.84

78.38

Overclaiming 26

References

Alicke, M. D. (1985). Global self-evaluation as determined by the desirability and
controllability of trait adjectives. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology,
49, 1621-1630.
Amodio, D.M., & Frith, C.D. (2006). Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex and
social cognition. Nature Reviews, 7, 268-277.
Bamacz, A., Johnson, A., Constantino, P., & Keenan, J. P. (2004). Schizotypal
personality traits and deception: The role of self-awareness. Schizophrenia
Research, 70, 115-116.
Barrios, V., Kwan, V.S., Ganis, G., Gorman, J., Romanowski, J., & Keenan, J. P. (2008).
Elucidating the neural correlates of egoistic and moralistic self-enhancement.
Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 451-456.
Bonanno, G.A, Field, N.P, Kovacevic, A., Kaltman, S. (2002). Self-enhancement as a
buffer against extreme adversity: civil war in Bosnia and traumatic loss in the
United States. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 184-196.
Bradley, J. V. (1981). Overconfidence in ignorant experts. Bulletin o f the Psychonomic
Society, 17(2), 82-84.
Brown, J. D. (1986). Evaluations of self and others: Self-enhancement biases in social
judgments. Social Cognition, 4, 353-376.
Byrne, R.W. (1997). Machiavellian intelligence. Evolutionary Anthoropology, 5, 172180.
Craik, F.I.M., Moroz, T.M., Moscovitch, M., Stuss, D.T., Wincour, G., Tulving, E., &
Kapur, S. (1993). In search of the self: a positron emission tomography study.

Overclaiming 27

Psychological Science, 10 (1), 26-34.
D ’Argenbeau, A., Feyers, D., Majerus, S., Collette, F., & Van der Linden, M. (2008)
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 3, 244-252.
Epley, N., & Whitchurch, E. (2008). Mirror, mirror on the wall: enhancement in self
recognition. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(9), 1159-1170.
DePaulo, B., & Kashy, D. (1998). Everyday lies in close and casual relationships.
Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 63-79.
Ganis G., Kosslyn S.M., Stose S., Thompson W.L, Yurgelun-Todd D.A. (2003) Neural
correlates of different types of deception: an fMRJ investigation. Cerebral Cortex,
13, 830-836.
Gonsalves, B., Reber, P.J., Gitelman, D.R., Parrish, T.B., Marsel-Mesulam, M., & Paller,
K.A. (2004). Neural evidence that vivid imagining can lead to false
remembering. Psychological Science, 15(10), 655-660.
Guenther, C. L., & Alicke, M. D. (2007). Self-enhancement and belief perseverance.
Journal o f Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 706-712.
Gusnard, D.A., Akbudak, E., Shulman, G.L., & Raichle, M.E. (2001). Medial prefrontal
cortex and self-referential mental activity: relation to a default mode of brain
function. Proceedings o f the National Academy o f Sciences, 98 (7), 4259-4264.
Hayward, G., Mehta, M.A., Harmer, C., Spinks, T.J., Grasby, P.M., & Goodwin, G.M.
Exploring the physiological effects of double-cone coil TMS over the medial
prefrontal cortex on the anterior cingulate cortex: an H2(15)0 PET Study (2007).
The European Journal o f Neuroscience.

Overclaiming 28

Heatherton, T. F., Krendl, A. C., Macrae, C. N., & Kelley, W. M. (2007). A social brain
sciences approach to understanding self. In C. Sedikides & S. J. Spencer (Eds.),
The s e lf(pp. 3 - 20). East Sussex: Psychology Press.
Izuma, K., Saito, D.N., & Sadato, N. (2009). The role o f medial prefrontal cortex and
striatum in reputation processing. Social Neuroscience, 24, 1-15.
John O.P, Robins R. (1994) Accuracy and bias in self-perception: individual
divergences in self-enhancement and the role of narcissism. Journal o f
Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 763-776.
Johnson, A., Bamacz, A., Yokkaichi, T., Rubio, J., Racioppi, C., Shackelford, T., Fisher,
M., & Keenan, J. P. (2005). Me, myself, and lie: The role of self-awareness in
deception. Personality and Individual Differences, 38, 1847-1853.
Johnson, M.K., Raye, C.L., Mitchel, K.L., Touryan, S.R., Green, E.J., & NolanHoeksema, S. (2006). Dissociating medial frontal and posterior cingulate activity
during self-reflection. Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience, 1 56-64.
Johnson, S.C., Schmitz, T.W., Kawahara-Baccus, T.N., Rowley, H.A., Alexander, A.L.,
Lee, J., & Davidson, R.J. (2005). The cerebral responses during subjective
choice with and without self-reference. Journal o f Cognitive Neuroscience, 17
(12), 1897-1906.
Kwan, V.S.Y, Barrios, V., Ganis, G., Gorman, J., Lange, C., Kumar, M., Shepherd, A., &
Keenan, J.P. (2007). Assessing the neural correlates o f self-enhancement bias: a
Transcranial magnetic stimulation study. Experimental Brain Research, 182,
379-385.
Kwan, V. S. Y., John, O. P., Kenny, D. A., Bond, M. H., & Robins, R. W. (2004).

Overclaiming 29

Reconceptualizing individual differences in self-enhancement bias: An
interpersonal approach. Psychological Review, 111, 94-110.
Kwan, V. S. Y., John, O. P., Robins, R. W., & Kuang, L. L. (2008). Conceptualizing and
assessing Self-Enhancement Bias: A Componential Approach. Journal o f
Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 1062-1077.
Langleben, D.D., Loughead, J.W., Bilker W.B., Ruparel, K., Childress, A.R., Busch, S.I.,
Gur, R.C. (2005) Telling truth from lie in individual subjects with fast eventrelated fMRI. Human Brain Mapping, 26, 262-272.
Lee, T.M.C, Liu, H.L, Tan, L.H, Chan C.C.H, Mahankali S, Feng C.M., Hou, J., Fox,
P.T., Gao, J.H. (2002). Lie detection by functional magnetic resonance
imaging. Human Brain Mapping, 15, 157-164.
Lou, H.C., Luber B., Crupain M., Keenan J.P., Nowak M, Kjaer T.W, Sackei, H.A.,
Lisanby, S.H. (2004) Parietal cortex and representation of the mental self.
Proceedings o f the National Academy o f Science, 101, 6827-6832.
Lockwood, P., & Matthews, J. (2007). The self as a social comparer. In C. Sedikides & S.
J. Spencer (Eds.), The se lf(pp. 9 5 -1 1 3 ). East Sussex: Psychology Press.
MacPherson, S.E., Bozzali, M., Cipolotti, L., Dolan, R.J., Rees, J.H., & Shallice, T.
(2008). Effect of frontal lobe lesions on the recollection and familiarity
components of recognition memory. Neuropsychologia, 46 (13), 3124-3132.
Macrae, C.N., Moran, J.M., Heatherton, T.F., Banfield, J.F., & Kelley, W.M. (2004).
Medial prefrontal activity predicts memory for self. Cerebral Cortex, 4 (14), 647654.
Mesmer-Magnus, J., Viswesvaran, C., Deshpande, S., & Joseph, J. (2006). Social

Overclaiming 30

desirability: the role of over-claiming, self-esteem, and emotional intelligence.
Psychological Science Quarterly, 48 (3), 336-356.
Morin, A. (2006). Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: a comparison and
integration of various neurocognitive views. Consciousness and Cognition, 15,
358-371.
Neisser, U. (1988). Five kinds of self-knowledge. Philosophical Psychology, 1 (1), 3559.
Okado Y, & Stark, C. (2003). Neural processing associated with true and false memory
retrieval. Cognitive and Affective Behavioral Neuroscience, 3, 323-34.
Ochsner, K.N., Beer, J.S., Robertson, E.R., Cooper, J.C., Gabrieli, J.D., Kihsltrom, J.F.,
& D ’Esposito, M. (2005). The neural correlates of direct and reflected selfknowledge Neuroimage 2$, 797-814.
Paulhus, D. L. (1991). Measurement and control of response bias. In J. P. Robinson, P.
R. Shaver, & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), Measures o f personality and social
psychological attitudes (pp. 17-59). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Paulhus, D.L., & John, O.P. (1998). Egoistic and moralistic biases in self-perception:
the interplay of self-deceptive styles with basic traits and motives. Journal o f
Personality, 66 (6), 1025-1060.
Paulhus, D.L., & Williams, K.M. (2002). The dark triad o f personality: narcissism,
machiavelianism, and psychopathy. Journal o f Research in Personality, 36, 556563.
Paulhus, D.L., & Harms. (2004). Measuring cognitive ability with the over-claiming
technique. Intelligence, 32, 297-314.

Overclaiming 31

Paulhus, D. L., Harms, P. D., Bruce, M. N., & Lysy, D. C. (2003). The over-claiming
technique: Measuring self-enhancement independent o f ability. Journal o f
Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 681-693.
Paulhus, D.L., & Reid, D.B. (1991). Enhancement and denial in socially desirable
responding. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 60 (2), 307-317.
Paulhus D.L. (1998) Interpersonal and intrapsychic adaptiveness o f trait self
enhancement: a mixed blessing? Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology,
74, 1197-1208.
Platek, S. M., Keenan, J.P., & Shackelford, T.K., (2006). Evolutionary Cognitive
Neuroscience. Boston, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Premack D.G., & W oodruff G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 1. 515-526.
Rossini, P.M., Barker, A.T., Berardelli, A., Caramia, M.D., Caruso, G., Cracco, R.Q.,
Dimitrijevic, M.R., Hallett, M., Katayama, Y., Lucking, C.H., Maertens de
Noordhout, A.L., Marsden, C.D., Murray, N.M.F., Rohwell, J.C., Swash, M., &
Tomberg, C. (1994). Non-invasive electrical and magnetic stimulation of the
brain, spinal cord, and roots: basic principles and procedures for routine clinical
application: report of an IFCN committee. Electroencehalography and Clinical
Neurophysiology, 91. 476-482.
Schnyer, D.M., Verfaellie, M., Alexander, M.P., LaFleche, G., Nicholls, L., & Kaszniak,
A.W. (2004). A role for right medial prefrontal cortex in accurate feeling-ofknowing judgements: evidence from patients with lesions to frontal cortex.
Neuropsychologia, 42 (7). 957-966.

Overclaiming 32

Sedikides, C., Rudich, E. A., Gregg, A. P., Kusmashiro, M., & Rusbult, C. (2004). Are
normal narcissists psychologically healthy?: Self-esteem matters. Journal o f
Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 400-416.
Seger C.A, Stone M, Keenan J.P. (2004) Cortical activations during judgments about
the self and an other person. Neuropsychologia 42, 1168-1177.
Sip, K.E., Roepstorff, A., McGregor, W., & Frith, C.D. (2007). Detecting deception: the
scope and limits. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(2), 48-53.
Snyder, M., & Simpson, J.A. (1984). Self-monitoring and dating relationships. Journal
o f Personality and Social Psychology, 47 (6), 1281-1291.
Snyder, M., & Gangestad, S. (1982). Choosing social situations: two investigations of
self-monitoring processes. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 43 (1),
123-135.
Snyder, M. (1974). Self-monitoring and expressive behavior. Journal o f Personality
and Social Psychology, 30 (4), 526-537.
Snyder, M., & Cantor, N. (1980). Thinking about ourselves and others: self-monitoring
and social knowledge. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 39 (2),
222-234.
Spence S.A, Farrow T.F.D, Herford A.E, Wilkinson I.D, Zheng Y, W oodruff P.W.R.
(2001). Behavioural and functional anatomical correlates of deception in humans.
Neuroreport, 12, 2849-2853.
Spence S.A, Hunter M, Farrow T., Green R., Leung D., Hughes C. Ganesen,V. (2005) A
cognitive neurobiological account of deception: evidence from functional
neuroimaging. Philos. Trans. Royal Society London, 359, 1755-1762

Overclaiming 33

Stevens, S.T., Guise, K., Christiana, W., Kumar, M., & Keenan, J.P. (2007). Deception,
evolution, and the brain. In: S. M. Platek, J.P. Keenan, & T.K. Shackelford
(Eds.), Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience, 518-540. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological
perceptive on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193-210.
Taylor, S.E., Lemer, J.S., Sherman, D.K., Sage, R.M., & McDowell, N.K. (2003).
Portrait of the self-enhancer: Well adjusted and well liked or maladjusted and
friendless. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 84 (1), 165-176.
Taylor, S.E., & Armor, D.A. (1996). Positive illusions and coping with adversity.
Journal o f Personality, 64 (4), 873-898.
Trivers, R. (1991). Deceit and self-deception: the relationship between communication
and consciousness. In M. Robinson & L. Tiger (Eds), Man and beast revisited,
(pp. 175-191). Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Vrij, A. (2001). Detecting lies and deceit: The psychology o f lying and the
implications fo r professional practice. New York: New York: John Wiley
and Sons, LTD.
Wasserman, E.M. (1998). Risk and safety of repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation: report and suggested guidelines form the International Workshop on
the Safety of Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, June 5-7, 1996.
Electroenchaphalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 108, 1-16.
Web, W.M., Marsh, K.L., Schneiderman, W., & David, B. (1989). Interaction between
self-monitoring and manipulated states of self-awareness. Journal o f

h., ;

Overclaiming 34

Personality and Social Pschology, 56 (1), 70-80.
Williams, K. M., Paulhus, D. L., & Nathanson, C. (2002). The nature of over-claiming:
Personality and cognitive factors. A poster presented to the annual meeting of
the American Psychological Association, Chicago, IL.

